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Abstract: This article analyses the Supreme Court decision in Rock Advertising Limited v MWB 
Business Exchange Centres Limited and the likely commercial impact on No Oral Modification clauses 
and the distinction between promises to pay more/promises to accept less in the doctrine of 
consideration.  The article suggests that in respect of the latter, this was a missed opportunity and 
suggests some potential ways forward. 
Introduction 
In Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited (Rock v MWB)1, the Supreme 
Court (SC) were given the opportunity to examine the validity of “No Oral Modification” (NOM) 
clauses and whether an agreement to pay less or pay later is supported by consideration.  Lord 
Sumption, delivering the lead judgment, states that this appeal is “exceptional”, given that 
“[M]odern litigation rarely raises truly fundamental issues in the law of contract”2.  It is therefore not 
an exaggeration to say that this decision has been much anticipated by commentators, particularly 
regarding the anticipated review of the anomalous Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) 
Ltd. (Williams v Roffey)3 and Foakes v Beer4 promises to pay more and promises to accept less 
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distinction regarding modification of contractual agreements.  Commentators have noted the 
deficiencies in English law in this area5 and might go further than Lord Sumption’s reflection that this 
is “probably [our emphasis] ripe for reexamination”6, to say that this is an area “ripe for 
reexamination” and that in declining to rule on the consideration point or provide obiter guidance, 
the court has missed an opportunity.  Saying that, the ruling on the NOM clause is interesting from 
an academic perspective and arguably useful from a commercial perspective and this article will 
explore the reasoning and implications of this.   This article explores some possible paths the SC 
could have taken in response to the Court of Appeal’s ruling on the consideration point, namely 
endorsing the part-payment of debt/promise to pay more distinction; extending the practical benefit 
concept to part-payment of debt; and elevating the doctrine of economic duress to replace the 
doctrine of consideration in contractual modification. 
Factual background and grounds of appeal  
Rock Advertising Ltd (the respondent) entered into a licence agreement with MWB Business 
Exchange Centres Limited (the appellant) to occupy office space for 12 months. The contract 
contained a clause which provided that ‘all variations to this licence must be agreed, set out in 
writing and signed on behalf of both parties before they take effect’.7  Rock accumulated arrears of 
licence fees, so a director of Rock proposed a revised schedule of payments. The proposal meant 
that some payments would be deferred, and the arrears would be spread over the remainder of the 
licence term.  This revision would be worth slightly less to MWB. There was a dispute as to whether 
MWB orally accepted this proposal. Thereafter MWB locked Rock out of the premises, terminated 
the agreement and sued for arrears. Rock counterclaimed damages for wrongful exclusion from the 
premises. 
Judge Moloney QC sitting in the Central London County Court, held that MWB were entitled to claim 
the arrears. He found that although the parties had agreed to the revised schedule, the oral 
variation did not satisfy the requirements of the original clause in the contract (clause 7.6) in that it 
was not in writing and signed on behalf of both parties. On the consideration point, he held that the 
variation agreement was supported by consideration because it brought practical advantages to 
MWB, those advantages being the commercial benefit to MWB in retaining an existing tenant; the 
hope of perhaps recovering its arrears; and avoiding allowing the property to stand empty for some 
time at further loss.8   
Rock appealed and the Court of Appeal (Arden, Kitchin and McCombe LJJ) overturned the first 
instance decision, finding that MWB were bound by the variation and not entitled to claim the 
arrears at the time when they did.  On the oral variation point, the appeal court considered the oral 
agreement to revise the schedule of payments also amounted to an agreement to dispense with 
clause 7.6. This indicates that the clause (which purported to prohibit variation of the contract by 
oral agreement) was capable of variation by the parties by oral agreement. In relation to the 
consideration issue, the Court of Appeal agreed with the court below that the variation was 
supported by consideration. 
                                                          
5 See e.g. A.Shaw-Mellors & J. Poole, “‘Recession, changed circumstances, and renegotiations: the inadequacy 
of principle in English law” (2018) 2 Journal of Business Law 101-121 and A. Boon Leong Phang, “Consideration 
at the crossroads” (1991) 107(Jan) Law Quarterly Review 21-24. 
6 Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited [2018] UKSC 24 at [18]. 
7 Clause 7.6. 
8 MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 553 at [14].  
MWB appealed to the Supreme Court on two issues: (i) whether a No Oral Modification (NOM) 
clause (a contractual term precluding amendment of an agreement other than in writing) is legally 
effective; and (ii) whether the variation of an agreement to pay money, by substituting an obligation 
to pay either less money or the same money later, is supported by the necessary consideration. 
 
Common law backdrop to contractual variations  
In relation to the consideration point in contractual variations, the common law makes a distinction 
between variations which (i) promise to pay more for performance of an existing contractual duty 
and (ii) those which vary an agreement to pay money, by substituting an obligation to pay less 
money (or the same money later).  
The law relating to the first situation is that performance of an existing contractual duty does not 
amount to good consideration (Stilk v Myrick)9 unless the person does more than their existing duty 
(Hartley v Ponsonby).10 However, in Williams v Roffey the court did enforce a promise made by 
Roffey Bros to pay Williams an extra sum of money for work which he was already under a pre-
existing contractual duty to perform. The court took the view that practical benefits such as avoiding 
a penalty clause, not having to find another contractor and a more structured payment scheme, 
could amount to consideration, with a focus being that there had not been any duress applied. The 
implication is that pre-Williams v Roffey contractual variations to pay more money for an existing 
contractual duty would be unlikely to have been enforceable for lack of consideration, whereas post-
Williams v Roffey the variation may be enforceable if there is a practical benefit. Commentators 
have generally welcomed the decision as reflecting commercial reality,11 although not everyone 
concurs.12 
Turning to the second situation, part-payment of a debt was not held to be sufficient consideration 
(Foakes v Beer)13.  In Pinnel’s Case14 it was said that “payment of a lesser sum on the day in 
satisfaction of a greater, cannot be any satisfaction for the whole”.  The rule in Pinnel’s is restricted 
in that if the debtor does something different, in that they pay earlier, or something extra (‘the gift 
of a horse, hawk or robe”), then it can amount to good consideration.   
The question became, could the ‘practical benefit’ concept adopted in Williams v Roffey apply to 
part-payment of a debt.  In Re Selectmove15, the Court of Appeal had the opportunity to provide an 
answer, and the answer was emphatically no.  The reason being that to extend the principle of 
Williams v Roffey to obligation to make payments was thought to have the effect of leaving the 
principle in Foakes v Beer without any application.  
This common law backdrop therefore identifies why one of the issues before the SC in Rock 
Advertising v MWB (whether a variation of an agreement to pay money, by substituting an 
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obligation to pay less money/some money later, is supported by the necessary consideration) was so 
timely and of such practical importance to the commercial world. 
 
Supreme Court decision  
i. Validity of a Non Oral Modification (NOM) clause 
Given that the entirety of the judgment except for one paragraph examines this issue, the reasoning 
and divergence, albeit of limited significance, between Lord Sumption and Lord Briggs needs to be 
explored.  The issue centres on whether parties can bind themselves in respect of future contractual 
variations via a clause which specifies the form which any such variation must adhere to, in this case, 
clause 7.6 which specified that any variation must be in writing and signed by both parties.  The 
reasons invariably given against the effectiveness of such clauses, Lord Sumption states, are that 
because English common law does not, with the exception of certain statutory provisions, require a 
contract to be in a particular form, the parties may agree to remove any requirements they have 
imposed on themselves and that agreement does not have to be in the form originally prescribed.  
Putting into context, Counsel for Rock submitted, just because clause 7.6 specified certain 
requirements for variation, this did not preclude variation by other means i.e. here the oral 
agreement between Mr Idehen and Ms Evans in respect of the revised payment schedule effectively 
rendered clause 7.6 redundant.   
The judgment sets out the traditional position as made by Cardozo J in Beatty v Guggenheim 
Exploration Co: 
“Those who make a contract, may unmake it.  The clause which forbids a change, may be 
changed like any other.  The prohibition of oral waiver, may itself be waived.”16 
Whilst acknowledging the long-standing support for this approach in other jurisdictions17 alongside 
that of English law,18 Lord Sumption notes that “[O]n the other side of this debate, there is a 
substantial body of recent academic writing which would give effect to No Oral Modification clauses 
according to their terms”19.  He then proceeds to set out his stall in the following paragraph, stating 
“[I]n my opinion the law should and does give effect to a contractual provision requiring specified 
formalities to be observed for a variation”.  Arguably, although the lack of exploration of the 
consideration point discussed below is disappointing, the development in this area is significant.   
Tackling the implications of the CA’s decision in MWB v Rock, namely that no matter how clearly 
expressed parties’ intentions are, they cannot bind themselves as to the form of any future 
variations, Lord Sumption disagrees with the key argument set out by Lord Justice Kitchin that this 
would negate the parties’ autonomy, providing the counterargument that: 
“[T]he real offence against party autonomy is the suggestion that they cannot bind 
themselves as to the form of any variation, even if that is what they have agreed.”20   
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Recognising that NOM clauses are commonly found in written contracts, Lord Sumption sets out the 
commercial reasons for including them, namely to avoid misunderstandings which may arise from an 
oral agreement and to ensure that it is only those with authority who can make such agreements.21  
Lord Briggs makes the salient point that it Mr Idehen and Ms Evans were “probably entirely 
unaware” of clause 7.622 and that their purported agreement was analogous to negotiations subject 
to contract, rather than Lord Sumption’s comparison with entire agreement clauses, i.e. in this case 
that the agreement would not take effect until drawn up as per clause 7.6 unless there has been 
express agreement to dispense with those formalities.  If the CA’s ruling on the validity of clause 7.6 
had been upheld, this would mean as O’Sullivan neatly puts it, “that the disputed oral variation, 
made on a bus by mobile phone, prevailed - cl. 7.6 was not worth the (signed) paper it was written 
on.”23  Recognising arguments on both sides,24 recently considered in Globe Motors Inc v TRW 
LucasVarity Electric Steering Ltd25, which came down on the side of such a clause being ineffective in 
the face of an oral variation, though this was an obiter discussion, O’Sullivan makes the strong point 
that although “[T]he unfettered sovereignty argument is formidable”, “[T]here is something 
paradoxical about freedom of contract being invoked to deny effect to a sensible contractual 
clause.”26  Or, as Lord Sumption puts it “the law of contract does not normally obstruct the 
legitimate intentions of businessmen”, except for reasons of public policy, of which there are none in 
this case.27 
Given that this decision is unequivocal in its recognition of the validity of NOM clauses, Lord 
Sumption takes pains to counter the, as he puts it, “entirely conceptual” argument that because 
there are no formal requirements for contract formation, parties may not bind themselves as to the 
form of future variations because freedom of contract would mean that any agreement, however 
informal, would undo the prior one.  He sets out where, as he puts it, this circle has been squared28 
and states that 
“These widely used codes suggest that there is no conceptual inconsistency between a 
general rule allowing contracts to be made informally and a specific rule that effect will be 
given to a contract requiring writing for a variation.”29 
Whilst Lord Briggs substantively concurs with Lord Sumption, he disagrees with the reasoning that 
not to recognise NOM clauses would override the parties’ intentions so that it would not be possible 
for them to bind themselves as to the form in which to achieve a variation in the future, stating 
instead that: 
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proceeds to address the issue in relation to collateral contracts, which we do not have scope to discuss here. 
“For as long as either (or any) party to a contract containing a NOM clause wishes the NOM 
clause to remain in force, that party may so insist, and nothing less than a written variation 
of the substance will suffice to vary the rest of the contract (leaving aside estoppel).”30 
The distinction is however he notes unlikely to “have any significant consequences for the 
application of the common law, save perhaps on very unlikely facts.”31 
The commercial implications of this decision are discussed below; however, it is interesting at this 
point to note the consideration Lord Sumption gives to the safeguard of reliance where a party 
performs in accordance with a purported variation believing it to be valid.  This is set out in both the 
Vienna Convention and UNIDROIT principles, meaning that reasonable reliance may preclude a party 
from relying on the original clause.32   
 
ii. Establishing consideration in an agreement to pay less or pay later 
Ruling that by failing to comply with the formalities specified in clause 7.6 of the licence agreement, 
the oral variation was invalid, meant that the SC felt it “unnecessary to deal with consideration”.33  
Nevertheless, although consideration is only discussed in one paragraph, this paragraph succinctly 
identifies the issues.  In part accepting the CA’s decision in MWB v Rock34 that having the premises 
occupied and increasing the likelihood of payment if the sums owed were deferred, Lord Sumption 
acknowledges the “practical value”, not interestingly the wording of Williams v Roffey “practical 
benefit” whilst noting that “neither was a contractual entitlement”, which looks rather like dancing 
on the head of a pin.  The problem with the commercial advantage as consideration argument is, 
and long has been, Foakes v Beer, in particular Lord Sumption notes, the comments of Lord 
Blackburn35 and the CA decision in Re Selectmove36 which declined to follow Williams v Roffey.  
Accepting the “arguable points of distinction”37, we would agree that “the arguments are somewhat 
forced”38 and would, as discussed above, have liked to see exploration of this issue.  This will have to 
wait though, as the SC states this will need to be before a full panel and as ratio decidendi rather 
than obiter dictum. 
 
Possible paths for contractual modifications 
                                                          
30 Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited [2018] UKSC 24 at [25]. 
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33 Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited [2018] UKSC 24 at [18] per Lord 
Sumption. 
34 MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 553. 
35 Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605 at 622. 
36 Re Selectmove [1995] 1 WLR 474. 
37 Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited [2018] UKSC 24 at [18] per Lord 
Sumption. 
38 Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited [2018] UKSC 24 at [18]. 
There are a number of ways forward for resolving the consideration issue in relation to contractual 
modifications.  Here, we focus on three possible approaches.  
i. Endorsing the promise to pay more/part-payment of debt distinction  
One way forward, and arguably the one adopted at present in view of the SC’s limited discussion of 
the consideration point, is to retain the distinction between promises to pay more (as in Williams v 
Roffey) and promises to accept less (as in Foakes v Beer).  
One reason that this might be desirable is that arguably, whilst difficult to justify conceptually, the 
principle works tolerably well in practice, partly because the strictness of the rule is mitigated by two 
areas. The first is that by not applying practical benefit to part payment of debt, a person can still 
ensure that his variation is enforceable by simply giving something extra (“a horse, hawk or robe”).39 
A second means of preventing injustice is the doctrine of promissory estoppel (a similar point was 
made by Lord Sumption about estoppel safeguarding against injustice in relation to NOM clauses).40 
Promissory estoppel operates where there is a pre-existing contractual relationship; a clear and 
unequivocal promise or representation is made; there is reliance on the promise; and it would be 
inequitable for the promisor to go back on the promise. In this way promissory estoppel can prevent 
a person going back on their promise to accept less in certain circumstances. Arguably, rather than 
extending the law of practical benefit to part payment of debt, the way forward may be to retain the 
existing distinction regarding consideration and use the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a back-
up.41 The advantage of this approach is that it sits well within contractual renegotiations, so rather 
than changing the law English law would have a body of authority sitting behind it. A further 
potential advantage of retaining Foakes v Beer, with promissory estoppel as a safeguard, is that the 
duress issue would be dealt with under the ‘inequitable to go back on promise’ point, which may go 
some way to alleviating concerns about elevating the doctrine of duress which is discussed below. 
Another reason for retaining the distinction is that arguably the practical benefit concept itself is 
flawed and uncertain, indicating that it should not be extended to such a key area for commerce as 
part payment of debt. Indeed, Lord Sumption noted during the hearing that “the extra speed of 
work, wasn’t itself a contractual variation, so although there was a practical benefit, there was no 
contractual benefit. The argument is that only contractual benefits can amount to consideration”.42 
This appears to differ from commentators’ viewpoints, who have noted that there are two different 
definitions of consideration; factual and legal,43 with Williams v Roffey adopting a factual definition 
of consideration.  This doubt over the practical benefit/contractual benefit issue could indicate that 
such an uncertain concept should not be extended. A further potential problem with Williams v 
Roffey (raised by counsel for the appellant) is that consideration has to be present as at the date of 
the variation, whereas in that case, at the date of variation the contractor only promised what he 
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at the hearing 1 February 2018. 
40 Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited [2018] UKSC 24 at [16]: “In England, the 
safeguard against injustice lies in the various doctrines of estoppel”. 
41 This potential increase in the significance of promissory estoppel may be welcomed: G. Treitel Some 
Landmarks of Twentieth Century Contract Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) for example, notes 
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42 Lord Sumption, MWB v Rock Advertising, UKSC 2016/0152 at the hearing 1 February 2018. 
43 R. Halson, “Sailors, sub-contractors and consideration” (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 183. 
was contracted to do - the practical benefit relates to performance (including avoiding the penalty 
clause).44  
Despite these potential advantages, the current state of affairs has led to adverse commentary. 
Shaw-Mellors argues “the consequence of Roffey appeared to be an anomalous difference in 
treatment between promises to pay more (a practical benefit was valid consideration) and promises 
to accept less.”45 Roberts notes “there was little logically to commend in an approach to variation 
contracts that viewed a practical benefit as being good consideration for an agreement to pay more, 
but that held that a practical benefit was not good consideration when the agreement was to accept 
less.”46 Arguably, this distinction is difficult to justify conceptually. Peel has argued that the least 
attractive option is to do nothing and that the current distinction between Foakes v Beer and 
Williams v Roffey, means that the “question of whether a promise to perform an existing obligation 
owed to the promisee may be good consideration is to be determined upon the arbitrary basis of the 
nature of the obligation in question: i.e. is it an obligation to pay money or to perform services?”47  
 
ii. Extending the practical benefit concept to part payment of debt  
An alternative approach would be to find that variation agreements for part-payment of a debt can 
be found to be supported by consideration, if there are practical benefits to the creditor.  In fact, it 
was this approach that was adopted by both the County Court judge and the Court of Appeal in this 
case. In MWB v Rock the CA found those benefits to be that MWB would recover some of the arrears 
immediately and would have some hope of recovering them all in due course, and secondly that 
Rock would remain a licensee and continue to occupy the property with the result that it would not 
be left standing empty for some time at further loss to MWB.48 Arden LJ noted this point as 
“avoiding a void”.49   
This path effectively extends the Williams v Roffey principle into part-payment of debt. It has a 
number of supporters, evidenced by some commentators welcoming the CA decision.  The decision 
was described as a pragmatic approach,50 and one which pursued a commercially sensible outcome.  
It was seen to offer more flexibility, be less formalistic and more reflective of modern commercial 
practice.51 Collins describes the recognition of practical benefit as sufficient consideration for a 
promise to accept less as “welcome”.52 In fact in Foakes v Beer itself, Lord Blackburn had made the 
point that “all men of business...do every day  ground that prompt payment of a part of their 
                                                          
44 Although Lord Sumption disagreed with this point at the hearing, as he said that it simply meant attaching 
value to an expectation at the time of the variation. 
45 A.Shaw-Mellors & J. Poole, “Recession, changed circumstances, and renegotiations: the inadequacy of 
principle in English law” (2018) 2 Journal of Business Law 101, 107. 
46 M. Roberts, “MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd: The Practical Benefit Doctrine Marches On” (2017) 80(2) 
Modern Law Review 343. 
47 E. Peel “Part payment of a debt is no consideration” (1994) 110(Jul) Law Quarterly Review 353, 355. 
48 MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 553 at [47]. 
49 MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 553 at [72]. 
50  A.Shaw-Mellors & J. Poole, “Recession, changed circumstances, and renegotiations: the inadequacy of 
principle in English law” (2018) 2 Journal of Business Law 101, 106.  
51 S. Wilken and K. Ghaly The Law of Waiver, Variation, and Estoppel, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) cited in A.Shaw-Mellors & J. Poole, “Recession, changed circumstances, and renegotiations: the 
inadequacy of principle in English law” (2018) 2 Journal of Business Law 101, 107. 
52 D. Collins “Part-payment of debt: a variation on a theme?”(2017) 28(7) International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 253, 258. 
demand may be more beneficial to them than it would be to insist on their rights and enforce 
payment of the whole”.53 The Williams v Roffey decision itself was welcomed by many 
commentators as the previous approach of the pre-existing duty doctrine was felt to be too “blunt” 
and “indiscriminate” and ran the risk of denying legal force to many freely negotiated 
modifications,54 suggesting that any development into modifications to pay less would be 
welcomed.55 The principles of economic duress were thought to offer a more sophisticated means of 
distinguishing extorted and non-extorted modifications. The extension of Williams v Roffey 
represents an attractive solution as it avoids the current distinction between promises to pay more 
and promises to accept less that has been described as difficult to justify conceptually. Interestingly, 
Arden LJ in the CA identified practical benefit as “replacing the word ‘the gift of a horse, hawk, or 
robe’ with a more modern equivalent”,56 intimating that the introduction of practical benefit to 
variations to pay less could be as simple as updating the terminology.   
However, in the SC Lord Sumption indicated the introduction of practical benefit to these types of 
variations would have a much more substantial impact on the law, and in particular, on Foakes v 
Beer: 
“In Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1, the Court of Appeal 
held that an expectation of commercial advantage was good consideration. The problem 
about this was that practical expectation of benefit was the very thing which the House of 
Lords held not to be adequate consideration in Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605”.57  
It seems therefore that this approach is unlikely to be seen as merely updating terminology and 
more likely to be recognised as, at the very least, substantially modifying the decision in Foakes v 
Beer. We would suggest that this path does not necessarily require overruling Foakes v Beer, in much 
the same way that Williams did not require Stilk v Myrick to be overruled. In fact, Foakes v Beer 
would need to be retained to deal with the situation where the benefit was solely payment of some 
of the arrears.     
However, it is important to recognise that to apply practical benefit to part payment of a debt would 
be an extension of what was envisaged by Williams v Roffey and therefore represents a significant 
development in the law.58 In Williams v Roffey, Glidewell LJ outlined six propositions for the concept 
to apply, the first of which requires if A has entered into a contract with B to do work for, or to 
supply goods or services to, B in return for payment by B.59 This suggests that to find practical 
benefit and therefore consideration in a promise to pay less than owed, would be a significant 
extension of the law. Arguably, the two situations (one involving goods and services, the other 
involving part payment of money) can be distinguished and therefore situations such as Williams can 
                                                          
53 Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605 HL at [622]. The Law Revision Committee in 1937 noted the validity of 
this view.  
54 R. Halson, “Sailors, sub-contractors and consideration” (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 184. 
55 A. Boon Leong Phang, “Consideration at the crossroads’ (1991) 107(Jan) L.Q.R. 21, 22 “... the dispensation 
with the concept of legal benefit or detriment in Williams v Roffey Bros is desirable in as much as the concept 
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be distinguished from scenarios such as Re Selectmove.60 Counsel for the appellant in the SC hearing 
persuasively made this point, referring to it as the “arithmetic” point, which argues that if 
consideration must be something of value, then payment of a smaller sum cannot be good 
consideration. Conversely, this can be distinguished from a Williams v Roffey scenario which involves 
good and services, whereby it is possible to arrive at a practical benefit representing something of 
value, in that case avoidance of a penalty clause. 
A potential problem with this extension is that it simply creates a new distinction between those 
part payment situations which strictly part pay a debt and those whereby there can be found to be 
some practical benefit. This new distinction would arise between different types of part payment 
situations rather than between promises to pay more/accept less. Therefore, extending practical 
benefit into part payment of debt simply replaces one definite distinction with a particularly fine 
one. A passage from the judgment at first instance in MWB v Rock highlights this point, with Judge 
Moloney QC noting that the benefit included a ‘hope’ of having debtor’s obligations rather than 
abandoning hope, suggesting a new distinction based on whether there is hope or not.”61 This 
approach simply creates a new distinction between part-payments that are enforceable as a result 
of practical benefit and those that are not.62  If the law goes further and finds practical benefit solely 
in having some of a debtor’s obligations honoured, then surely this would mean every variation 
would be capable of amounting to consideration, which effectively abandons the need for 
consideration in variation contracts without explicitly saying so. 
Another area of concern with this approach is the lack of certainty it creates for the commercial 
world. Imagine a scenario where party A owes party B and C. Party A is in difficulty in both cases and 
party B and C agree to accept less. Party B experiences some practical benefit from this variation of 
the original contract (perhaps keeping a building occupied) whilst party C does not. If the practical 
benefit doctrine is applied, party A’s variation with B will be enforceable as there will be 
consideration, and the one with C will not. Counsel for the appellant cautioned that this could lead 
to a plethora of cases exploring what is practical benefit in this situation and what is not, which 
could lead to unwelcome commercial uncertainty.63  
A further issue would be the impact this approach would have on other doctrines, notably economic 
duress, promissory estoppel and potentially NOM clauses. If the courts are able to apply the 
practical benefit concept to variations that pay less than owed, it is reasonable to assume that more 
cases would be found to be supported by the necessary consideration. This shifts the emphasis onto 
the assessment of whether there has been any economic duress64 (as in fact it did in Williams v 
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63 D. Collins “Part-payment of debt: a variation on a theme?”(2017) 28(7) International Company and 
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Roffey65). Whilst some commentators welcome this shift, the possible problem with this is that the 
economic duress doctrine is thought to be a developing one, with uncertain boundaries as discussed 
below.  Another effect would be to reduce the significance of promissory estoppel as presumably in 
Central London Property Trust v High Trees House Ltd66 the court would have been able to find a 
practical benefit in having the flat occupied during the war.  A further impact would be on NOM 
clauses themselves, in that if the court is more likely to find consideration, then the need for a NOM 
clause becomes greater. 
A final point is that many commentators question whether applying the principle in Williams v 
Roffey and overturning Foakes and Beer is going far enough, noting that a test of practical benefit 
may be difficult to apply in some cases and that “concentration solely on the issue of consideration 
would fail to address the real problem of distinguishing between those renegotiated contracts which 
should be enforced and those which should not.”67  
 
iii. Elevation of the doctrine of duress  
As mentioned above, another potential solution in respect of contractual modifications is to remove 
the requirement of consideration and thus avoid the tautologous findings on ‘practical benefit’.68  
The idea of economic duress stepping in here is not a new one and has been discussed at length in 
relation to the Williams v Roffey decision and subsequently, and has support amongst 
commentators.69  Allowing economic duress to effectively police contractual modifications would 
mean that variations would be binding provided there was no duress, a point specifically noted in 
Williams v Roffey, which stipulated that the requisite ‘practical benefit’ would not have been found 
had duress been present.70  Those cautioning against such a move note that the doctrine is relatively 
recent in the law of contract.  Writing on Williams v Roffey in 1991, Phang, whilst in favour of this 
proposition, noted that “the doctrine is still in its infancy, and one hopes that the courts will be able 
to develop more concrete guidelines in future cases.”71  Twenty-seven years later the question may 
be whether or not there are more concrete guidelines or it may be whether this is necessary, given 
that we have an established body of case law which sets out considerations for the court when 
evaluating whether there has been economic duress, with the Pao On ‘coercion of the will’ approach 
having shifted towards the question of whether there was a practical alternative.72    
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Whilst the question of ‘lawful act duress’73 does not seem to have been resolved, this may not 
preclude economic duress from stepping into the role of policing contractual modifications.  In an 
article where the title speaks for itself ‘Economic duress: an elegant and practical solution’, Ogilvie, 
considering the Canadian position, suggests that the difficulties with the doctrine are  
“largely because it has been assumed to be concerned with other concepts which are not 
easily understood or defined such as agreement, consent, coercion, illegitimacy and 
illegality”74 
Finding much merit in the Canadian Court of Appeal decision Greater Fredericton Airport Authority 
Inc v NAV Canada75, where the court undertook an extensive review of English and Canadian case 
law, Ogilvie favours this pared back test for economic duress generally and which could be utilised 
for contractual modifications, namely that economic duress will only be found where the party 
under duress has no practical alternative but to agree to the demand.  Her view that evidence of 
market conditions and the complainant’s situation can “easily” be gathered and that this simple 
“factual test” is “workable and should yield fair outcomes”, is certainly an appealing one.76  
Similarly, Coote, considering the New Zealand position as set out in Antons Trawling Co Ltd v Smith77, 
notes the merits of doing away with consideration entirely in contractual variations, stating that 
“The importance of consideration is as a valuable signal that the parties intend to be bound by their 
agreement, rather than an end in itself.”78  Acknowledging the possible use of duress and fraud to 
control such variations and ensure that a party could not purposely underprice a contract to secure 
the work and then seek to obtain higher payment for it, he notes that the New Zealand court has 
gone further in stating that other “policy reasons” could prevent a variation from being binding.  
Coote suggests that this could be applied flexibly in situations where conduct falls short of duress or 
fraud but is for example contrary to good faith.   
The New Zealand approach would present obvious difficulties for the English courts, particularly 
given the reluctance to adopt a good faith requirement79 and it is suggested that the approach 
Ogilvie favours would be far more acceptable.  Adopting the doctrine of economic duress to police 
contractual modifications is not without difficulty though.  However attractive a pared back test 
seems, there remain inherent difficulties.  Shaw-Mellors suggests that if we accept a shift from 
consideration to duress “it is imperative that duress be clearly defined and delineated.  It has not 
been.”80  He also highlights the difficulties with a potential two-stage approach as set out in Williams 
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v Roffey, that the party seeking to establish consideration in the form of practical benefit would have 
to prove that it did not exercise duress, which presents obvious evidential difficulties.81  Shaw-
Mellors also highlights the problem with rescission and the well-established bars, which could result 
in the injured party left without a remedy as seen in The Atlantic Baron.82  To the argument that a 
party should act quickly if they had agreed to modification under duress, he notes that the delay 
may be as a result of the duress itself.  A possible solution to this is that a finding of duress could 
extend to the delay itself and that delay in itself would not necessarily invoke the bar of affirmation.   
This does suggest the need for further guidance from the courts though and an extensive review of 
the case law on economic duress specifically in the area of contractual variations would be welcome.   
We would suggest however that this is a pathway which merits further exploration by the courts and 
that the argument that the doctrine is in its infancy cannot last forever.  No doctrine has arrived 
‘fully grown’ and the common law is arguably sophisticated enough to formulate sufficient precision 
for economic duress to play a key role in this area.   
 
This section has considered three potential ways forward for dealing with contractual variations. 
However, it is important to note that commentators have discussed a number of other options, 
including overruling Williams v Roffey entirely83 or removing consideration as a contractual 
requirement completely84 i.e. not just for modification of contracts (discussed above).85 We have 
chosen to focus on those options that seem to offer the most likely ways forward. 
 
Commercial implications of this decision  
i. use of Non Oral Modification clauses: 
It seems that this decision brings commercial certainty to the area of NOM clauses in that businesses 
can have confidence that a well-drafted clause will avoid the difficulties of a disputed modification 
and the need to ascertain the authority of those authorising the purported modification.  Lord 
Bridge’s analogy with subject to contract negotiations discussed above seems a sensible one, with 
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any proposed modifications returning to the key decision makers who can then decide to vary the 
contract according to the NOM clause or not.  From a practical perspective, it would be advisable for 
the relevant employees to know about the clause but that should not present difficulties.  Increased 
certainty in this area does not solve the issue of modification under duress, however potentially the 
requirement for recording a modification formally could mitigate the possibility of ‘on the spot’ 
acquiescence under duress, by giving ‘breathing space’ and time to raise concerns and seek legal 
advice. 
ii. Practical benefit in agreements to accept less or later:  
As discussed above the lower court and CA agreed that there was ‘practical benefit’ in this case, 
though not as widely drawn as per Williams v Roffey.  Given that the SC did not decide on this point, 
this presents difficulties from a commercial perspective and future decisions are likely to be decided 
on a fact specific basis.  Although this may increase flexibility, this does seem to be at the expense of 
certainty.  Perhaps a ‘belt and braces’ approach is advisable i.e. a NOM clause and specifying 
particular consideration, even if nominal, rather relying on ‘practical benefit’ as per the CA decision 
in MWB v Rock.   A problem with this though is that, whilst large organisations with legal advisors 
will no doubt be aware of the consideration requirement, small organisations most likely will not, 
potentially resulting in a continuation of a post-facto analysis of events and intentions in disputes 
regarding contractual modifications. 
Linking the implications above together, it may be that the decision in Rock v MWB in the SC means 
that the resounding approval of NOM clauses lessens the problems with consideration in contract 
variation. If a variation has been made, and the original contract had a NOM clause in it, then the 
variation may not be valid because it has not complied with the formalities required by the NOM 
clause - there would be no need to cover the consideration issue (as in fact happened in Rock v 
MWB itself in the SC). It may mean that the spotlight falls more on whether there is a NOM clause in 
place in the future.86  
 
Conclusions 
The ruling on enforceability of NOM clauses is emphatic and, whilst future case law will need to be 
monitored, this does prima facie seem to have settled this issue.  However, as has been noted here 
and elsewhere, the law in relation to the consideration/practical benefit issue remains in a state of 
flux.  Collins, whilst welcoming the CA decision in MWB v Rock, notes “practical benefit is not a legal 
panacea, and its precise composition and sustainability in law remains unclear.”87  As we and many 
others have discussed, there does not appear to be one obvious solution to the problem and lack of 
clarity remains following the SC court decision.  This begs the question of when the area, which Lord 
Sumption suggested was “a difficult one” and “probably ripe for reexamination”88, will next come 
before a fully constituted panel , why, knowing the issues, this was not heard before such a panel 
and indeed why a fully constituted panel is necessary, given that there have been reviews on key 
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contract law issues without.89  As Lord Sumption notes in the opening paragraph, this appeal was 
“exceptional”.  Regrettably, in respect of the consideration point, the judgment was not. 
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